Titlebook: Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis; Jean-Fran?ois Mertens,Sylvain Sorin Book 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dord

青春期

Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

Malleable

Economic Applications of the Shapley Valueons so as to maximize some social utility function. On the contrary, analysing the government as subject to the influence of those who elected it brings new light on both aspects. Value appears to be a natural tool to deal with the voting games that are part of the two corresponding models. In the l

Factorable

Etymology

Value of Games with a Continuum of Playersof players. The Shapley value is one of the basic solution concepts of cooperative game theory. It can be viewed as a sort of average or expected outcome, or even as an a priori evaluation of the players’ utility of playing the game.

Watemelon

Pantry

Value Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Casesapplication of various game theoretic solution concepts to these models has yielded important understandings. Most notably are the two well-known “principles”: the . and the . They show that Walrasian equilibria arise from completely new foundations.

cultivated

懶惰人民

An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenonee, e.g., [1], [2], [3], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [19], [20]). We attempt to understand this phenomenon by making explicit certain crucial properties that are common across these solutions and on which — at bottom — the equivalence depends.

時代錯誤

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