Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; 7th International EA Lingjie Duan,Anibal Sanjab,Rachid Elazouzi Conference proceedings 2017 ICST Institute for Co

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書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)




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書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

夜晚

A Multitype Hawk and Dove Gamean decide whether to act aggressively (Hawk) or peacefully (Dove). Each individual is characterized by its strength. The strength distribution among the population is assumed to be fixed and not to vary in time. If both individuals involved in an interaction are Hawks, there will be a fight, the res

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Assortative Mixing Equilibria in Social Network Gamesof their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is it that such relations are more convenient and easier to maintain? Or are there also some more tangible benefits to be gained from this collective behaviour?.The current work takes a game-theoretic perspective on this phenomenon, an

exceptional

Incorporate

On the Finite Population Evolutionary Stable Strategy Equilibrium for Perfect Information Extensive form games. In this adaptation, players reach a finite population evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium by using finite population evolutionary stable strategies which ensure that the game ends up with equal payoffs. We studied the fpESS equilibria of some famous two-player bargaining games such

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Designing Cyber Insurance Policies: Mitigating Moral Hazard Through Security Pre-Screeningity. However, in the absence of regulated insurance markets or compulsory insurance, the introduction of insurance deteriorates network security. This is because by transferring part of their risk to the insurer, the insured agents can decrease their levels of effort. In this paper, we consider the

opalescence

A Game-Theoretic Model for Analysis and Design of Self-organization Mechanisms in IoTti-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically establish the criteria that lead t

Ardent

Demulcent

Rules for Computing Resistance of Transitions of Learning Algorithms in Gamesal games, the SSSs of the log-linear learning algorithm are the minimizers of the potential function. The SSSs can be characterized using the resistance trees of a Perturbed Markov Chain (PMC), they are the roots of minimum resistance tree. Therefore, computing the resistance of trees in PMC is impo

dictator

Optimal Control of Multi-strain Epidemic Processes in Complex Networksress. Despite the rapid development of vaccines and drugs, one challenge in disease control is the fact that one pathogen sometimes generates many strains with different spreading features. Hence it is of critical importance to investigate multi-strain epidemic dynamics and its associated epidemic c