Titlebook: Game Theory and Fisheries Management; Theory and Applicati Lone Gr?nb?k,Marko Lindroos,Pedro Pintassilgo Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerl

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書目名稱Game Theory and Fisheries Management網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名




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書目名稱Game Theory and Fisheries Management被引頻次學科排名




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書目名稱Game Theory and Fisheries Management讀者反饋學科排名

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Basic Concepts in Game Theory, strategic and extensive forms. The most widely used solution concept in game theory, the Nash equilibrium, is presented as well as arguments that support its applicability. The two basic approaches in game theory, non-cooperative games and cooperative games, are outlined. Finally, the North Sea her

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Non-cooperative Coalition Formation Games in Fisheries,international fisheries agreements. This chapter presents a stylized p-game to model internationally shared fisheries. In a p-game, the formation of coalitions is endogenous, as a result of a non-cooperative process. The main outcomes of this model are discussed, namely, the free-rider incentives an

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Introduction to the Application of Game Theory in Fisheries Management,urces, fishery economists analysing such management had no choice but to bring game theory to bear. The steadily increasing complexity of international fishery management brought forth the need for game theory models of greater and greater sophistication. The application of game theory to the econom

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Non-cooperative Coalition Formation Games in Fisheries,mong its members. These games leave unanswered an important question: which coalition will form? Coalition formation games provide the answer to this question by determining the equilibrium coalition endogenously. In this chapter, we concentrate on the most widely used type of coalition formation ga