找回密碼
 To register

QQ登錄

只需一步,快速開始

掃一掃,訪問微社區(qū)

打印 上一主題 下一主題

Titlebook: Game Theory; A Multi-Leveled Appr Hans Peters Textbook 2015Latest edition Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2015 Applic

[復(fù)制鏈接]
樓主: expenditure
41#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 17:25:16 | 只看該作者
Textbook 2015Latest editionversion of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topic
42#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 20:14:32 | 只看該作者
43#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 00:37:48 | 只看該作者
44#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 03:52:19 | 只看該作者
Cooperative Game Models such solution concepts. For instance, one can argue that the core for TU-games is based on strategic considerations whereas the Shapley value is based on a combination of efficiency and symmetry or fairness with respect to contributions. The latter is made precise by an axiomatic characterization as in Problem?9.17.
45#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 10:13:14 | 只看該作者
46#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 14:53:09 | 只看該作者
Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmung chapter, this bad outcome can be avoided if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. This, however, is coming at a price, namely the existence of a multitude of outcomes attainable in equilibrium. Such an . is expressed by a so-called ..
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 15:56:03 | 只看該作者
Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmung over the types of the other players. Often, these probability distributions are assumed to be consistent in the sense that they are the marginal probability distributions derived from a basic commonly known distribution over all combinations of player types.
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 21:02:46 | 只看該作者
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 03:52:26 | 只看該作者
Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehreng negative payments—if the coalition is actually formed. More generally, it is an amount of . and the implicit assumption is that it makes sense to transfer this utility among the players—for instance, due to the presence of a medium like money, assuming that individual utilities can be expressed in monetary terms.
50#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 04:12:04 | 只看該作者
Cooperative Games with Transferable Utilityng negative payments—if the coalition is actually formed. More generally, it is an amount of . and the implicit assumption is that it makes sense to transfer this utility among the players—for instance, due to the presence of a medium like money, assuming that individual utilities can be expressed in monetary terms.
 關(guān)于派博傳思  派博傳思旗下網(wǎng)站  友情鏈接
派博傳思介紹 公司地理位置 論文服務(wù)流程 影響因子官網(wǎng) 吾愛論文網(wǎng) 大講堂 北京大學(xué) Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
發(fā)展歷史沿革 期刊點(diǎn)評 投稿經(jīng)驗(yàn)總結(jié) SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系數(shù) 清華大學(xué) Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
QQ|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋| 派博傳思國際 ( 京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-10-13 17:12
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博傳思   京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328 版權(quán)所有 All rights reserved
快速回復(fù) 返回頂部 返回列表
永安市| 河间市| 山丹县| 大城县| 新津县| 陇川县| 酒泉市| 新泰市| 双柏县| 陆川县| 西盟| 庆元县| 安阳县| 南陵县| 寿宁县| 石城县| 涪陵区| 乐昌市| 乳山市| 栾城县| 唐海县| 永和县| 海晏县| 贡山| 保山市| 察雅县| 南木林县| 泸州市| 临潭县| 长寿区| 兴隆县| 纳雍县| 千阳县| 隆德县| 莱州市| 宣化县| 额敏县| 江永县| 周至县| 高雄县| 陆河县|