Titlebook: Game Theory; John Eatwell,Murray Milgate,Peter Newman Book 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989 decisi

不利

時(shí)代錯(cuò)誤

Extensive Form Games,tion and thus provides an exact description of ‘who knows what when’ and ‘what is the consequence of which’. The model should contain all relevant aspects of the situation; in particular, any possibility of (pre)commitment should be explicitly included. This implies that the game should be analysed

Overdose

Fair Division,l rights to the goods. Both equity (according to criteria discussed below) and efficiency are sought. The theory is of interest primarily because its approach to allocation problems enjoys some important advantages over the alternative approach suggested by neoclassical welfare economics, and becaus

FAR

Games with Incomplete Information, themselves but also to their competitors. In practice, this assumption is rarely correct. Once the attempt is made to include uncertainty (not just about the environment but also about other strategic actors) within economic models, it becomes necessary to broaden those models substantially to incl

自戀

考得

誘使

intolerance

Nash Equilibrium,st to Cournot (1838). This entry begins with the formal definition of a Nash equilibrium and with some of the mathematical properties of equilibria. Then we ask: To what question is ‘Nash equilibrium’ the answer? The answer that we suggest motivates further questions of ., which we consider in two v

同步信息

Guileless

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5decision theory; game theory; Prisoner‘‘s dilemma