Titlebook: Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research; T. Parthasarathy,B. Dutta,A. Sen Book 1997 Springer Science+Business M

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Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research978-1-4757-2640-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13554-6btained in this way satisfy the properties of the Kohlberg-Mertens program except Invariance. In order to overcome this problem our solution concept is modified in such a way that all properties formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens are satisfied.

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Probability of Obtaining a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Matrix Games with Random Payoffsuilibrium, p, will be a weighted sum of the probabilities of obtaining a pure strategy equilibrium, p., with s distinct payoffs, the weights, q. being the probabilities of obtaining s distinct payoffs from N. However, as N → ∞ the probability q. → 1. In this limiting case p = P. Although p. has been

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Nonlinear Self Dual Solutions for TU-Gameshese modified solutions take into account both, the ‘power’, i.e. the worth, and the ‘blocking power’ of a coalition, i.e. the amount which the coalition cannot be prevented from by the complement coalition, in a totally symmetric way. As a direct consequence of the corresponding definitions they ar

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