Titlebook: Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research; T. Parthasarathy,B. Dutta,A. Sen Book 1997 Springer Science+Business M

共同時(shí)代

Keratin

用樹皮

Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information the Deterministic Symmetric CaseEvery two person game of incomplete information in which the information to both player is identical and deterministic has an equilibrium.

Cosmopolitan

叫喊

使痛苦

悲痛

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92408-3hese modified solutions take into account both, the ‘power’, i.e. the worth, and the ‘blocking power’ of a coalition, i.e. the amount which the coalition cannot be prevented from by the complement coalition, in a totally symmetric way. As a direct consequence of the corresponding definitions they ar

conjunctivitis

myelography

Offensive

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92527-5already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of