Titlebook: European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023; Jelena B?umler,Christina Binder,Andreas R. Ziegler Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if appli

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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023被引頻次學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023年度引用學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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Springer Optimization and Its Applicationst to government procurement. The language of GATT Article III:8(a) is vague and imprecise despite attempts by certain panels and the Appellate Body to interpret this provision. In the . dispute, GATT Article III:(8)(a) was interpreted in the context of Turkey’s drug insurance reimbursement scheme, w

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Sumit Bhowmik,Jagadish,Kapil Guptae Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Despite significant normative developments in the GPA since its establishment in 1979, the number of parties remains relatively low, with concerns about opening public procurement markets to international competition being a key factor. This study analyses p

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MELON

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0621-4ocurement: Article 10 III b excludes certain purchasing arrangements between legally separate public entities from the scope of the public procurement law. So while public procurement is usually subject to national as well as international rules on non-discrimination, competition and transparency, I

預(yù)測

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09177-8a major topical concern of the European Commission. Traditional . antitrust interventions have proven insufficient in addressing the consequences of dominance in the realm of the digital economy. Since timely rectification of market failures is of crucial importance, this article presents a perspect