Titlebook: Explorations in Public Sector Economics; Essays by Prominent Joshua Hall Book 2017 Springer International Publishing AG 2017 collective ac

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4742-8ommon pools. In some institutional environments, however, many roads were club goods maintained through reciprocal arrangements. Private toll roads arose where possible but collecting tolls on “public” roads was a government prerogative. Nonetheless, as government action undermined club-good arrange

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Celiac-Plexus

,Public Choice Issues in International Collective Action: Global?Warming Regulation,s, the underlying political collective action processes have been neglected. We focus on the impact of uncertainty in assessing the benefits and costs of global warming regulation on constituencies and politicians in the bargaining countries. Uncertainty arises due to basic information problems abou

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Too Inexpensive to Be Inexpensive: How Government Censorship Increases Costs by Disguising Them, services and take credit for reducing their costs. While these policies may reduce prices, they are a form of censorship that invariably increases costs. Politically inspired interference in the communication that takes place through market prices reduces the information and discipline required to

Ancestor

LASH

Bad Economics, Good Law: The Concept of Externality,public economics. This chapter argues that law deals with the matter of externality in an economically efficient manner. Courts largely ignore the term externality despite its common use in economics and, more importantly, law has changed little to incorporate the now-common economic meaning of exte

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,Why?Would Bond Referenda Ever Fail? Do They?,s. This study examines the entire population of local bond referenda in Ohio from 1963 through 1987. The results do tend to support the hypothesis that agenda setters attempt to raise expenditures above the level preferred by the median voter. Although about half of all referenda fail, most projects

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思考

Ballots, Bribes, and Brand-Name Political Capital,nd for investment in brand name and voter persuasion and for votes bought outright. We see that a secret ballot increases the cost of monitoring paid voters and changes the relative prices for obtaining voter support through bribery and investment in brand name capital, increasing the demand for cam

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