Titlebook: Explorations in Ethics; David Kaspar Book 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature

我沒有強(qiáng)迫

The Modal Conception of Ideal Rational Agents: Objectively Ideal Not Merely Subjectively Ideal, Advclosely examining the requirements for an agent to be ideal. Ideal agents would be objectively ideal in that they would robustly possess and exercise maximal capacities for knowledge-acquisition and desire-satisfaction. They must additionally be agentially concerned as follows. They must have a gene

Consensus

To Boldly Go Where No Man, or Woman, Has Gone Before!,g the ., according to which for any three outcomes, A, B, and C, if, all things considered, A is better than B, and all things considered, B is better than C, then, all things considered, A is better than C. Whether or not the Axioms of Transitivity hold, he suggests, depends on the nature of the go

Anguish

Well-Being as Harmony,, Von Kriegstein develops a notion of harmony between mind and world that has three aspects. First, there is a . between mind and world in the sense that events in the world match the content of our mental states. Second, there is a . toward the world, meaning that we have pro-attitudes toward the w

GOUGE

On Moral Architecture,principle-driven must now get down to the business of justifying their reliance on such principles, clarifying not merely their content but also their nature. Here, Diana Heney argues that what is at stake in this dispute are our deeply embedded practices of codification—our shared moral architectur

visceral-fat

The Central Difficulty of the Moral Life, we commend, or to do something which . we condemn’. Agents finding themselves in a situation that preys on a personal weakness, which results in them betraying their moral convictions, succumb to this difficulty. How should agents deal with moral weakness? While this is clearly a subject for ethics

Chagrin

Desert-Sensitivity and Moral Evaluation,lso believes that some form of desert-sensitivity is a necessary component of any plausible moral theory. In Sect. ., he discusses Shelly Kagan’s view that desert-sensitivity creates a certain indeterminacy in morality. He then explores the ways in which he thinks that Kagan may have missed some sig

characteristic