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Titlebook: Experimental Economics; Volume I: Economic D Pablo Branas-Garza,Antonio Cabrales Book 2015 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)

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樓主: 力學(xué)
31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 22:54:34 | 只看該作者
Game Theory: Basic Concepts,analysis and the answers to questions posed in the other chapters.. We start by explaining the concept of a game, and then proceed to study different types of games under the assumption of complete information, as well as corresponding notions of equilibrium.
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 01:59:20 | 只看該作者
Cooperation,trary, cooperate for the common good. A classic example of this type of situation is the provision of public goods: as in the case of national defense, where anyone can declare they are not interested in such protection (and not pay for it), knowing that the army will defend them anyway in the case of an invasion.
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 05:51:53 | 只看該作者
The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2015
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 13:06:54 | 只看該作者
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 17:17:26 | 只看該作者
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 17:49:19 | 只看該作者
Experiments in Economics,earch has been expanding at a rapid and sustained pace. Currently, the majority of economists will accept that a theory whose predictions do not receive any support in the lab should at least be reconsidered. The laboratory allows us to locate human decision-makers in an analogous situation to that
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 01:33:31 | 只看該作者
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 05:24:56 | 只看該作者
Game Theory: Basic Concepts,analysis and the answers to questions posed in the other chapters.. We start by explaining the concept of a game, and then proceed to study different types of games under the assumption of complete information, as well as corresponding notions of equilibrium.
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 06:48:31 | 只看該作者
Coordination Games,s there are numerous situations in which we are required to coordinate with friends, professors, colleagues, other firms, etc. Coordination may sometimes appear to be an easy task, but yet in some cases, regardless of their importance, it can be elusive because certain features hinder the possibilit
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 13:33:49 | 只看該作者
Initial Responses in Strategic Situations,e examples where, for different reasons, behavior may differ from the Nash equilibrium prediction. Subsequently, we describe different models that have been used to account for alternative types of behavior in novel situations. Finally, we explain the most common experimental techniques used to anal
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