Titlebook: Experimental Business Research; Volume II: Economic Amnon Rapoport,Rami Zwick Conference proceedings 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 Manageme

CRUC

Durable Goods Lease Contracts and Used-Goods Market Behavior: An Experimental Study,us consumers have confirmed many salient features predicted by the theoretical model. These features include the segmentation of subjects into classes of behavior, and directional response to pricing in the used-good market to the provision in lease contracts.

FLIC

apiary

Dynamic Stability of Nash-Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms: Reconciling Theory and Experiments,ism is a supermodular game in a quadratic environment if and only if the subsidy coefficient is greater than or equal to one. These results are consistent with the findings in seven experimental studies.

LOPE

Comparative Statics for RDEU Theorys underlying each model. In other words, we try to identify the environments in which the model really works. Our models yield results that may be different or occasionally inconsistent. In order to evaluate the results, we argue that the setting of the models and the implications of their implicit assumptions are important.

譏諷

不整齊

食道

Accessible

帽子

Generalized Hyperbolic Secant Distributionsn, and 3) learning trends across iterations of the stage queueing game in some of the experimental conditions. We propose and subsequently test a simple reinforcement-based learning model that, with a few exceptions, accounts for these major findings.

Inculcate

Internet Congestion: A Laboratory Experiment,ium does a good job of predicting the impact of network capacity and noise amplitude. Overall efficiency is quite low, however, and players overdissipate potential rents, i.e., earn lower profits than in Nash equilibrium.