Titlebook: Experimental Business Research; Volume II: Economic Amnon Rapoport,Rami Zwick Conference proceedings 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 Manageme

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Towards a Hybrid Model of Microeconomic and Financial Price Adjustment Processes: The Case of a Mar the laboratory converge towards the static predictions of microeconomic theory with a resulting classical efficiency of allocation. Yet, the informational efficiency of market prices, often treated as a starting axiom for financial market theory, requires instead that current prices represent fair

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Experimental Evidence on the Endogenous Entry of Bidders in Internet Auctions,ving sealed-bid auctions for collectible trading cards over the Internet. Manipulating the reserve prices in the auctions as an experimental treatment variable generates several results. First, observed participation behavior indicates that bidders consider their bid submission to be costly, and tha

ORBIT

Hard and Soft Closes: A Field Experiment on Auction Closing Rules,periment on late bidding behavior. Pairs of $50 gift certificates were auctioned simultaneously on Yahoo! Auctions, using a randomized paired comparison design. Yahoo? site allows sellers to specify whether they wish to use a hard or soft close, and this enabled us to run one auction in each pair wi

ORBIT

Fallibility

Bonus versus Penalty: Does Contract Frame Affect Employee Effort?,easured participants’ contract preference, their degree of expected disappointment about having to pay the penalty or not receiving the bonus, their perceived fairness of their contract, and their effort level. Consistent with Luft (1994), we find that employees generally preferred the bonus contrac

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Managerial Incentives and Competition,managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s . performance (profits), collusion can be sustained. However, when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s . performance (their profits relative to the other firm’s profits), this drives the market to the competitive and efficient outcome. These resu

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