Titlebook: Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models; Essays by and in Hon Mostapha Diss,Vincent Merlin Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland

莊嚴(yán)

Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensionsown that certain voting rules suffer from this paradox in principle, the extent to which it is of practical concern is not well understood. We aim at filling this gap by analyzing the likelihood of the NSP for six Condorcet extensions (Black’s rule, Baldwin’s rule, Nanson’s rule, Max-Min, Tideman’s

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洞察力

Exaggerate

挫敗

猛烈責(zé)罵

Education and Migration in an Asian Contextr-issue situations is nearly zero when using an assumption that exaggerates the likelihood that such a paradoxical outcome will be observed. We conclude that it is very unlikely that a Strict Ostrogorski Paradox would ever be observed in any real voting situation with a large electorate.

有組織

Developing Common Values and Principlesnatives, the probability of the NSP is rather small (less than 4% for four alternatives and all considered preference models, except for Copeland’s rule). As the number of alternatives increases, the NSP becomes much more likely and which rule is most susceptible to abstention strongly depends on the underlying distribution of preferences.

賭博

Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstentionn three-candidate elections under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption. It appears in general that the possibility of indifference or abstention increases or decreases the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules depending on the rule under consideration or the probability distribution on the set of observable voting situations.

compassion

一個(gè)姐姐

Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensionsnatives, the probability of the NSP is rather small (less than 4% for four alternatives and all considered preference models, except for Copeland’s rule). As the number of alternatives increases, the NSP becomes much more likely and which rule is most susceptible to abstention strongly depends on the underlying distribution of preferences.