Titlebook: Essays on Explanation and Understanding; Studies in the Found Juha Manninen,Raimo Tuomela Book 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht

Mechanics

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舔食

Amorous

Emilio Garcia,Brenda Vale,Robert Vale If we deliberate correctly, we will reach the wisest decision possible. In ., G. H. von Wright puts forward the view that human actions can be explained by appealing to so-called practical inferences. In an indirect way, his view is a continuation of that philosophical tradition.

commonsense

Masahiro Mohri,Wolfgang Schaperral phenomena are explained, and predicted, on the causal model: to explain a natural event is to specify its cause, and such an explanation is thought to yield predictions for similar events. One modern form of this causal approach, according to von Wright, is the so-called deductive-nomological mo

背叛者

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-342-6r of powerful considerations against a causal theory of action. Because of this that theory has been on the defensive, and the sheer bulk of papers criticizing it made it seem in full retreat. The tide has turned recently, and the causal theory is no longer on the defensive. Some of the criticisms h

LIMIT

Rémi de Matos Machado,Joseph P. Hupys own right [and one] which is a definite alternative to the subsumption-theoretic covering law model”. He continues, “Broadly speaking, what the subsumption-theoretic [or Hempelian D-N] model is to causal explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleologica

郊外

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04846-4cal explanation. In particular, many critics of the deductive covering law model of explanation seem to implicitly assume that their arguments . apply to inductive explanations as well. A more sophisticated position is held by G.H. von Wright, who does not discuss inductive explanations in his work

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