Titlebook: Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation; John C. Harsanyi Book 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Hollan

喚起

Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Ratder risk and uncertainty. The author has shown in earlier papers that if we take the Bayesian rationality postulates seriously, and take an individualistic point of view about social welfare, then our social welfare function must be a linear function of individual utilities: indeed, it must be their

frozen-shoulder

Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior the concept of rational behavior. The paper starts with a discussion of the common-sense notion of rational behavior. Then, the rationality concepts of classical economics and of Bayesian decision theory are described. Finally, some (mostly fairly recent) advances in game theory are briefly discuss

menopause

flavonoids

Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflictse assumption that each participant (or ‘player’) has a set of well-defined and mutually consistent basic objectives, and will choose his actual policies in accordance with these objectives without any mistake. In technical terms this means that each player has a well-defined ‘utility function’ expre

pineal-gland

講個故事逗他

GRAVE

A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizationsn for social status is perhaps more conspicuous in those societies, like the American, where the ruling ideology encourages a striving for upward social mobility, for movement to higher social status positions. But it seems to be no less important in those societies, like the traditional Indian cast

erythema

Palatial

嚴(yán)厲譴責(zé)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9327-9behavior; conflict; conflicts; dynamics; ethics; game theory; interaction; methodology; morality; online; orga