Titlebook: Equity Financing and Covenants in Venture Capital; An Augmented Contrac Karoline Jung-Senssfelder Book 2006 Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachme

從容

Appraisal: From Theory to Practicehe analysis is the observation by Cumming and Walz (2004) that “[t]here is no single optimal form of venture finance”. despite the fact that theory claims that only convertible securities always optimally and endogenously allocate cash flow rights to the contracting parties and thereby induce them t

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Vienna Circle Institute Libraryio companies in the German venture capital market. Similar to the theoretical model in Chapter 4, its focus lies on the contractually defined allocation of cash flow rights to the contracting parties. It therefore adopts an . approach in order to consider not only the cash flows resulting from finan

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Sebastiano Carbonara,Davide StefanoThis chapter presents a critical overview of theoretical and empirical literature on cash flow incentive mechanisms in venture capital contracting and identifies significant research gaps.

體貼

Evaluation in Academic English,This chapter presents a synthesis of the above theoretical and empirical analyses on cash flow allocations in German augmented venture capital contracts in Chapters 4 and 5. It compares real-world practices with incentive considerations and derives implications for an improved venture capital contract design in the German market.

伙伴

Review of Academic Literature,This chapter presents a critical overview of theoretical and empirical literature on cash flow incentive mechanisms in venture capital contracting and identifies significant research gaps.

勛章

Synthesis,This chapter presents a synthesis of the above theoretical and empirical analyses on cash flow allocations in German augmented venture capital contracts in Chapters 4 and 5. It compares real-world practices with incentive considerations and derives implications for an improved venture capital contract design in the German market.

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Book 2006rns used in the German venture capital market. Integrating theoretical and empirical findings, the author derives implications for an improved incentive-driven contract design In Germany. With its state-of-the-art analyses, the dissertation contributes extensively to the existing international theor

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