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Titlebook: Equilibrium Facility Location on Networks; Tan C. Miller,Terry L. Friesz,Roger L. Tobin Book 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 C

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樓主: fungus
31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 22:07:45 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02405-4ch models, as well as techniques for generating algorithms to solve these models. In this chapter, by means of several linked numerical examples, we further illustrate the potential insights which an equilibrium facility location modeling approach can identify. Specifically, we will compare the resu
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 03:00:20 | 只看該作者
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 05:44:49 | 只看該作者
C. Ciliberto,R. Miranda,M. Teicherstribution decisions and general economic equilibria. Our approach has focused on the construction of bilevel equilibrium facility location models under two alternative conditions of economic equilibria; namely, a spatial price equilibrium and a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium. We have demonstr
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 11:42:43 | 只看該作者
Introduction,and and fixed prices. These models generally seek to minimize the firm’s costs (or maximize its profits) subject to meeting the predetermined demand constraints. More recently, efforts have begun to incorporate explicitly into mathematical models the impact that new facilities’ production will have
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 15:19:54 | 只看該作者
Aspatial Stackelberg Nash Cournot Equilibria,ti-market spatial equilibria later in this book. Further, by focusing on a one market, non-locational problem, we can develop insights into the properties of market equilibria problems such as the curvature of the revenue function in a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot model and issues regarding the uniquene
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 18:05:43 | 只看該作者
Classical Plant Location on Networks,an one for which the locating firm is either a price taker or a monopolist, so that the analysis of competition is especially simple. Although these classical models are non-equilibrium models, an understanding of their assumptions and mathematical formulations is essential to understanding the equi
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 22:33:34 | 只看該作者
Spatial Market Equilibria on Networks, describe economic competition and determine a market equilibrium among firms on the network. Such economic models include the classic spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model, first introduced by Samuelson (1952), and enhanced for over three decades since then (e.g., Takayama and Judge, 1964) as well
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 02:25:39 | 只看該作者
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 08:42:43 | 只看該作者
A Facility Sizing and Location in Spatial Price Equilibrium Model,one can employ to describe economic competition amongst firms on the network. These economic models include the classic spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model, first introduced by Samuelson (1952) and enhanced for over three decades since then (e.g., Takayama and Judge, 1964) as well as models of oli
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 11:29:48 | 只看該作者
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