Titlebook: Epistemology; Duncan Pritchard Book 2016Latest edition The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 epistemology.knowledge.sceptic

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8829-6nowledge which is ‘Gettier-proof’. We noted that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition that if one has knowledge then one has a true belief that could not have easily been wrong. In light of this fact, one natural thought to have is that rather than fixating on avoiding Ge

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02019-3ge. The first — the . — was that knowledge is due to cognitive ability. The second — the . — was that knowledge excludes luck. When we first introduced these two intuitions about knowledge we also noted that one could regard them as closely related. What does it take to ensure that one’s true belief

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E. D. Ramsey,B. Minty,R. Babecki have historically been some people who have proposed such a position, its philosophical interest does not rest on whether there are any actual sceptics. The reason for this is that, properly expressed, radical scepticism is meant to be a ., in that it exposes a deep tension in our own epistemologic

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