Titlebook: Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions; Michael Bacharach (Professor of Economics and Dire Book 1997 Kluwer Academic Publis

heterogeneous

不利

Daizhan Cheng,Hongsheng Qi,Zhiqiang Li any game the strategies that might be chosen by rational and intelligent players who know the structure of the game, and who recognize each other’s rationality and knowledge. The problem was not to find the set of strategies that satisfied some independent characterization of rationality and intell

服從

Series and Integral Representations,owing an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of . (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.

淡紫色花

獨裁政府

On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledgeowing an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of . (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.

Forsake

Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the extensive form of Figure 1.

interference

落葉劑

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3agents; bounded rationality; decision theory; economics; game theory; knowledge; reason

榨取

ENDOW

Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions978-1-4613-1139-3Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044