Titlebook: Environmental Economics and the International Economy; Laura Marsiliani,Michael Rauscher,Cees Withagen Book 2002 Springer Science+Business

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?ffentlichrechtliche Stellung des Arztesodds with the assumption of stringent environmental regulation of both proponents and opponents of the ‘Porter Hypothesis’. A possible explanation may be provided by examining the negotiation of environmental regulation in a ‘political market’. In this market, stakeholder attempt to ensure their pre

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19512-4ique county-level data set for New York State from 1980–1990, and a new empirical model: a semi-nonparametric empirical method based on propensity score matching. Our empirical estimates suggest that “dirty” firms . responding to environmental regulations, but more importantly we find that tradition

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Andreas M?ller,Andreas H?uslein,Arno Rolfhould ERUs be tradable in the international permit market or usable only to project partners? This important Kyoto detail has received little attention, although the trading rule is a key determinant of incentives to carry out abatement projects. We show that because generating ERUs on a project-by-

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56945-6to Protocol. Energy- en carbon-intensive industries in these countries fear that policies to implements these reduction targets will harm their competitiveness, endanger employment and will not improve the global environment, because of carbon leakage. Various studies have analyzed competitiveness a

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https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-48021-2Carbon Leakage; environment; environmental economics; environmental policy; income distribution; internat

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Environmental Economics and the International Economy