Titlebook: Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought; John E. Atwell Book 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1986 Immanuel Kant.Kant.freed

玉米棒子

Brooks Atkinson,Robert G. Loweryargument of this essay is completed. But in this final chapter I want to consider two issues which have arisen several times and which, suitably construed, constitute fundamental objections to Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole. The first issue is the relationship between happiness and morality,

親屬

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4345-2Immanuel Kant; Kant; freedom; liberty; truth

exigent

978-94-010-8431-4Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1986

關(guān)心

大漩渦

Nijhoff International Philosophy Serieshttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/309971.jpg

debble

咽下

Hemodialysis

Maxims,, for example, in the principle of the universality of nature (PUN). “Act as if the maxim of your action wereito become through your will a universal law of nature” (Gr. 421). This is the chief (and perhaps the sole) principle which Kant actually uses for judging the Tightness of actions, that is, f

使出神

Universality and the categorical imperative,t to play in moral theory. Does it, for example, merely state what moral obligation or duty is?. Is it, in other words, merely a conceptual formula of the moral “ought” (in contrast to nonmoral “oughts”)? Or does the categorical imperative (perhaps in addition to the former role) inform us of which

mortgage

Ends and moral obligation, to have genuine moral goodness, i.e., if agents of those actions are to act from duty and thereby exercise a good will. This means, in terms of maxims, that an action is morally good only if the agent’s incentival maxim is that of conscientious adherence to the demand of morality for its own sake.