Titlebook: Electronic Voting; Second International Robert Krimmer,Melanie Volkamer,Carsten Schürmann Conference proceedings 2017 Springer Internationa

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Return Code Schemes for Electronic Voting Systems,s generated as a multiparty computation of a secure MAC tag applied on an encrypted message submitted by a voter. Our proposals enjoy a great level of flexibility with respect to various usability, security, and performance tradeoffs.

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Eos a Universal Verifiable and Coercion Resistant Voting Protocol, votes anonymously. Voters may assume multiple pseudo identities, one of which is legitimate. We use the others to signal coercion to the Election Authority. Eos uses two mixing phases with the goal to break the connection between the voter and vote, not to preserve vote privacy (which is given alre

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Verifiability Experiences in Government Online Voting Systems,ve implemented these properties in their voting systems. However, not all the systems have adopted the same levels of verifiability nor the same range of cryptographic mechanisms. For instance, Estonia (2013) and New South Wales (Australia, 2015) started by adopting individual verifiability to their

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How Could Snowden Attack an Election?,e voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election re

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Estonian Voting Verification Mechanism Revisited Again,nts to the weaknesses and questionable design choices of the new scheme. We show that the scheme does not fix the vote privacy issue it claims to. It also introduces a way for a malicious voting application to manipulate the vote without being detected by the verification mechanism, hence breaking t

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9428-3at Eve acts as maliciously as possible. From an economic perspective, Eve tries to maximize her utility in a game with other participants. The game’s rules are determined by the system and its security mechanisms, but Eve can invent new ways of interacting with participants. We show that Eve can be