Titlebook: Effects of Insurance on Maritime Liability Law; A Legal and Economic Muhammad Masum Billah Book 2014 Springer International Publishing Swit

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14634-3nt into the shipping sector. Today its proponents argue either the lack of insurance capacity or the cost of insurance for unlimited liability as a reason for its continued existence. The opponents criticize it mostly for its consequence in depriving the victims of maritime accidents from adequate c

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-2589-6red. This may not be the case with the oil pollution liability law because the victims of oil pollution are not always insured against the damage from such pollution. As a result, the oil pollution liability regime needs to cater for both goals of liability law: . and .. However, the intended goal o

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-14075-5what should be the ideal liability laws in the presence of widespread modern insurance. A frequently asked question in the discussion of liability law and liability insurance is how to maintain incentives towards care in the mind of potentially liable parties after they purchase liability insurance.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29779-4nsurance in the past led to some special maritime liability rules, today the presence of wide-spread marine insurance brings with it some new policy implications for maritime liability laws. One such policy implication seems to be the gradual adoption of compulsory insurance in various marine enviro

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Saiyidi Mat Roni,Hadrian Geri Djajadikertaof liability under an economic analysis. Compensation would be important when liability claimants are not insured. This is because compensation only transfers the burden of loss from one party to another, while deterrence reduces possible losses by inducing a liable party to take care.

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Introduction,s continue to exist today when commercial insurance is available? What should be the goal of liability law when both liability claimants and liable parties are usually insured against their respective losses and liabilities? Does the presence of liability insurance reduce the deterrent effect of lia