Titlebook: Effectivity Functions in Social Choice; J. Abdou,H. Keiding Book 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991 Nash equilibrium.coop

令人發(fā)膩

引水渠

Book 1991her we try to put some of the results together in order to get a reasonably coherent theory about the role of the power structure in cooperative implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Pete

雇傭兵

0924-6126 tive implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Pete978-94-010-5525-3978-94-011-3448-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044

健壯

Introduction,individuals alone, independently of the actions of the rest of society. This possibility of influencing society’s choice reflects the . in the society: A group of individuals is powerful if it can enforce some alternatives or actions upon society.

Admire

ostensible

Implementation,ned social choice correspondence Core(.,·), assigning to each profile . the set of alternatives belonging to the core of . at this profile. This social choice correspondence has considerable intuitive appeal; at least it would be undesirable that society should choose a dominated alternative if ther

試驗(yàn)

reaching

Implementation in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium,One might get the impression that this is the only interesting cooperative solution. This is wrong, however. For all its merits, the strong Nash equilibrium cannot be considered as the only way of formulating a cooperative solution.

nitric-oxide

allude