Titlebook: Economics of Information Security and Privacy III; Bruce Schneier Conference proceedings 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York 201

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30965-7normous gap between potential and actual harm. The answer, we find, lies in the fact that an Internet attacker, who attacks en masse, faces a sum-of-effort rather than a weakest-link defense. Large-scale attacks must be profitable in expectation, not merely in particular scenarios. For example, know

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19001-8survey. First, losses are extremely concentrated, so that representative sampling of the population does not give representative sampling of the losses. Second, losses are based on unverified self-reported numbers. Not only is it possible for a single outlier to distort the result, we find evidence

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34443-6system and come up with policy recommendations. A large number of stakeholders were contacted, and their expertise has been reflected in the study. The formal outcome of the study was the publication by ENISA in early 2011 of a detailed technical report, “.. This paper presents a much abridged versi

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Brandschutzkonzept und Brandschutznachweis,nce of malware. However, assessing the suitability of countermeasures at this scale is hard. In this paper, we use an agent-based model, called ASIM, to investigate the impact of policy interventions at the Autonomous System level of the Internet. For instance, we find that coordinated intervention