Titlebook: Economics and Management of Franchising Networks; Josef Windsperger,Gérard Cliquet,Mika Tuunanen (Re Conference proceedings 2004 Springer-

Oratory

摘要

實(shí)施生效

Economics and Management of Franchising Networks978-3-7908-2662-3Series ISSN 1431-1941 Series E-ISSN 2197-716X

蹣跚

帶來的感覺

initiate

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96738-2al choice while controlling for the potential influence of resource scarcity factors. The study reported here extends the extant empirical franchising literature in three ways. First, this study takes the outlet as the unit of analysis and explores organizational choice within the franchise system.

羊欄

,über Syntropie von Krankheitszust?nden, the property rights theory we argue that the contractual mix between company-owned and franchised outlets depends on the distribution of intangible assets between the franchisor and franchisee. The more important the franchisor’s system-specific assets relative to the franchisee’s local market asse

認(rèn)為

血友病

Biologische Behandlung organischer Abf?lleer overhead cost, increased responsiveness and flexibility, and greater operational efficiency (Lozenzoni and Baden 1995). In addition, thanks to interfaces between many units, the network is a powerful tool to foster innovation. However, networks can also block innovation because of the divergence

FOLD

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58818-1 these four categories of contracts, in accordance with the degree of restriction imposed on the retailer. The aim of this paper is to explain why networks choose franchising contracts, and more precisely why they opt for this degree of vertical integration. Section 2 highlights the relevance of the