Titlebook: Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts; Essays in Honor of J Gerald A. Feltham,Amin H. Amershi,William T. Ziemb Book 1988 Kluwer Ac

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Communication of Private Information in Capital Markets: ,r news always design contracts to “separate” themselves from agents with worse news, or whether there are conditions under which they choose to “pool.” The answer to this question has significant implications for the value of verified reports.

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Managerial Compensation: ,composition of top executive compensation packages is different from that of workers in other occupations. Particularly notable is the recent trend toward paying a substantial portion of the total compensation in the form of incentive plans, such as annual bonus, long-term performance reward, stock

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e put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham‘s review of John Butterworth‘s pioneering978-94-010-7702-6978-94-009-2667-7

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