Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 15th International C Arunesh Sinha,Jie Fu,Tao Zhang Conference proceedings 2025 The Editor(s) (if ap

Infect

dragon

MARS

On Countering Ransomware Attacks Using Strategic Deceptioneypots, honeyfiles, and network honeypots in subgames. Using closed-form backward induction, we evaluated Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). We perform a numerical analysis using real-world data and statistics pertaining to the impact of ransomware attacks in the healthcare sector. Our healthc

星星

Largess

Extended Horizons: Multi-hop Awareness in?Network Gamessk spillovers, emphasizing the dependency of agents’ efforts on the nature of?their dependencies (complement vs. substitute nature of efforts), agents’ different levels . of awareness of the network effects, and?the reactive vs. passive nature of lower awareness (lower .) agents?to those with higher

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in?Graphs: Resource Takeover Games in?Graphs dynamical systems, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) takeover strategies. Second, for scalar linear discrete-time dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the system. Additionally, fo

RENAL

Effective Anonymous Messaging: The?Role of?Altruismize the emerging equilibria, quantify?the impact of different types and levels of altruism, and assess?the efficiency of potential outcomes versus socially optimal allocations. Moreover, taking a mechanism design approach, we?show how the betweenness centrality (BC) measure can be utilized?to achiev

猛烈責罵

Towards a?Game-Theoretic Understanding of?Explanation-Based Membership Inference Attacks explanation variance and compute an optimal threshold for membership determination. We propose a sound mathematical formulation to?prove that such an optimal threshold exists, which can be used to launch MIA and identify conditions for a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in this dynamic system. Fin

Genteel

DUST

Fuzzy-Chips und Hardwaresystemeions of having one or multiple quantum miners to?the security of the Bitcoin network? We conduct a novel game theoretic and economic analysis to address these questions. Simulation illustrates that quantum miners would have to collude to gain?from double spending in a quantum competitive environment