Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 15th International C Arunesh Sinha,Jie Fu,Tao Zhang Conference proceedings 2025 The Editor(s) (if ap

CT951

書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




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書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名




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書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

Synthesize

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74835-6cyber security; cyber defense; data security and privacy; artificial intelligence; cyber economics; cyber

媒介

Graves’-disease

Infect

Fuzzy MOMSDM for Dynamic Machine Allocation,ng methods are time-consuming, resource-intensive, and prone to human errors. Current trends?in automated penetration testing are also impractical, facing significant challenges such as the curse of dimensionality, scalability issues, and lack of adaptability to network changes.?To address these iss

Pedagogy

ns built into a model can?have substantial financial or even national security impacts. Computer scientists are often asked to optimize for worst-case outcomes,?and since security is largely focused on risk mitigation, preparing?for the worst-case scenario appears rational. In this work,?we demonstr

Pedagogy

希望

Fuzzy-Chips und Hardwaresysteme, which relies on proof-of-work mining to secure the underlying blockchain protocol. Miners empowered by quantum computers will have superior computational power to win the competition. The quantum advantage jeopardizes?the security and trustworthy of cryptocurrency and the transaction validation pr

肉身

大酒杯

The Search for Human Intelligence goods in selected areas. We?model this as a large two-player zero-sum one-shot game played on a?graph representation of the physical world, with the optimal logistics plans described by the (possibly randomized) Nash equilibria of?this game. Our logistics model is fairly sophisticated, and is able?