Titlebook: Dynamic Games in Economics; Josef Haunschmied,Vladimir M. Veliov,Stefan Wrzacz Book 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Conflict S

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書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics被引頻次




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics年度引用




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics讀者反饋




書目名稱Dynamic Games in Economics讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

PAD416

Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign,e the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.

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1566-0419 eory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12.th. Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality..978-3-662-51193-0978-3-642-54248-0Series ISSN 1566-0419 Series E-ISSN 2363-8370

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Robust Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Dynamic Choice Model with Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting,on time. This requirement, in turn, leads to a non-cooperative infinite horizon stochastic game played by a countably many . representing him during the play. As a result, we provide two existence theorems for a robust Markov perfect equilibrium (.) and discuss its properties.

爭議的蘋果

Differential Games and Environmental Economics,lution control and the lake game. It will be shown that existing solution techniques can cover some of the gap between non-cooperative Nash equilibria and the cooperative outcome. It will also be shown that the regulation by means of realistic tax rates can cover some of the remaining gap but not all the way.

foreign

Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenee to which the foreign competitor can absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods the properties of a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game are characterized and the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined.

foreign

Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftene the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.

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bronchodilator

cardiac-arrest

Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaften procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and an illustration is presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with uncertainties in stock dynamics and future payoffs is analyzed.