Titlebook: Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics; Tamer Ba?ar Conference proceedings 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986 decision makin

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Conference proceedings 1986h one dominant player (leader) acquires dynamic information involving the actions of the others (followers), and constructs policies (so-called incentives) which enforce a certain type of behavior on the followers; Chapter 3 deals with such a class of problems and presents some new theoretical resul

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Optimal Strategic Monetary Policies in Dynamic Interdependent Economies,onary model is developed for two interdependent symmetric economies, where the objective of each policy maker is to trade off in an intertemporally optimal way the rate of inflation and unemployment in his economy. Then, the equilibrium is studied under a variety of behavioral assumptions. These inc

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