Titlebook: Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games; Theory, Solution Tec David W. K. Yeung,Leon A. Petrosyan Textbook 2022 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and

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WCOM (World Class Operations Management)cial activities, the participants’ game horizons differ because of different life spans, different entry and exit times, different terms of office and the different durations of leases. The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized and an illustrative example is provided. Yeung and Petrosyan then

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Carlo Baroncelli,Noela Balleriothe reality that future events are often unavoidable, durable-strategies dynamic games are cast into a stochastic framework. A dynamic optimization theorem involving durable strategies problems with stochastic elements in the state dynamics and payoff structures is developed. The game equilibrium so

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92742-4Dynamic Game Theory; Dynamic Optimization; Decision Theory; Operations Research; Computational Mathemati

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978-3-030-92744-8The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl

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Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games978-3-030-92742-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044

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Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games: Theory and Solution Techniques,e state dynamics. A novel dynamic optimization theorem involving durable strategies is developed as the foundation for the derivation of game equilibria. Worth noting is that both the current state variables and previously executed durable strategies appear as given in the stage optimization problem

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