Titlebook: Differential Information Economies; Dionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. Yannelis Book 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005 Differenti

overrule

商店街

Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plansation at the . stage to execute the trade contracts. We prove a result about the nested structure of the set of allocations implementable by various communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions.

lobster

1431-8849 is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. Thi

人充滿活力

craven

Engineering Rural Development for Africations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.

Largess

Engineering Rural Development for Africapresence of at least one core element with equal treatment suffice to show existence of a competitive quasi-equilibrium. Conditions on the initial endowments and the communication system are given to ensure that every competitive quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium.

采納

鋸齒狀

幻影

間諜活動

Prelude: Psychology in Metamorphosis,st described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler’s multidivisional firm.