Titlebook: Democratic Counterinsurgents; How Democracies Can William Patterson Book 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclu

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Malaya,ed a ground-breaking counterinsurgency campaign demonstrating that a democratic country could use a new strategy and innovative tactics to defeat an insurgency in a foreign land. Though the exact replication of the particular tactics used in Malaya is not to be recommended for other conflicts, since

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Iraq,especially in a foreign land. If viewed through the wrong lens, it may appear to strengthen the (incorrect) lesson of Vietnam that such efforts are futile. Once again, the most powerful state in the world was prevented from reaching its war aims by a militarily weaker insurgent force in a developing

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2752-8588 retrenching fromtwo bungled foreign wars that involved deadly insurgent uprisings, this is a particularlyimportant argument. Succumbing to the trauma of those engagements and drawingthe wrong conclusions about counterinsurgency can only lead to further defeatin the future. Rather than assuming that

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-38053-6culture’ and ‘legitimacy’ are examined. Also analyzed are the arguments of those who believe that democracies are uniquely disadvantaged in counterinsurgencies. The reasons for this supposed weakness are presented and critically examined in terms of the strength of their logic and the weight of the supporting empirical evidence.

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Mitbestimmung im ?ffentlichen Dienst democracies are uniquely incapable of successfully conducting counterinsurgency has also been shown to be unpersuasive. This concluding chapter recapitulates the evidence mustered throughout this book, demonstrating that democracies can in fact win counterinsurgencies if they utilize the appropriate strategy.