Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 10th International C Tansu Alpcan,Yevgeniy Vorobeychik,Gy?rgy Dán Conference proceedings 2019 Spring

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書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




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書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

Medley

FRET

You only Lie Twice: A Multi-round Cyber Deception Game of Questionable Veracity,nce of interactions between an attacker and defender in a cyber environment. Second, we derive closed form expressions for a version of this model that capture the optimal strategies for both the attacker and defender. Third, we identify the potential behavior of an attacker at noncritical points via a Markov Decision Process (MDP) simulation.

靈敏

Discussion of Fairness and Implementability in Stackelberg Security Games,ion and the other with labels. We discuss the implementability of these constraints. In the case that the constraints are not implementable we present models to retrieve pure strategies in a way that they are the closest in average to the set of fairness constraints.

騎師

Investing in Prevention or Paying for Recovery - Attitudes to Cyber Risk,t allow us to categorize different approaches to risk taking. We show that many individuals appear relatively risk loving in that they invest in recovery rather than prevention. We find little difference in behavior between a gain and loss framing.

梯田

梯田

0302-9743 missions.The papers focus on? ?protection of heterogeneous, large-scale and dynamic cyber-physical systems as well as managing security risks faced by critical infrastructures through rigorous and practically-relevant analytical methods..978-3-030-32429-2978-3-030-32430-8Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

Obstacle

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1he model is a description of why the disclosure of vulnerabilities can only be an optimal policy when the cost to the hacker of searching for a Zero-Day vulnerability is small. The model is also extended to discuss Microsoft’s new “extended support” disclosure policy.

hypnotic

0302-9743 eld in Stockholm, Sweden, in October 2019..The 21 full papers presented together with 11 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 47 submissions.The papers focus on? ?protection of heterogeneous, large-scale and dynamic cyber-physical systems as well as managing security risks faced by

Optic-Disk

Towards a General Theory of Identifiabilityblems, those in the non-cooperatively computable class, the correctness guarantee of the malicious protocol effectively requires semi-honest parties as well. This suggests a wider utility than previously thought for semi-honest protocols.