Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; Second International John S. Baras,Jonathan Katz,Eitan Altman Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-V

圖表證明

ARIA

Security Games with Market Insurance of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, character

MAOIS

裂縫

Maximizing Influence in Competitive Environments: A Game-Theoretic Approach within a market and which, if any, become dominant. In this paper, we introduce a model for Dynamic Influence in Competitive Environments (DICE). We show that existing models of influence propagation, including linear threshold and independent cascade models, can be derived as special cases of DICE

neuron

Collaborative Location Privacy with Rational Usersn-based service (LBS) with their current coordinates. However, LBS providers collect a significant amount of data from mobile users and could be tempted to misuse it, by compromising a customer’s location privacy (her ability to control the information about her past and present location). Many solu

intrigue

關(guān)節(jié)炎

intention

散布

依法逮捕

0302-9743 nternational Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011, held in College Park, Maryland, USA, in November 2011. The 16 revised full papers and 2 plenary keynotes presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in topical secti