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Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; First International Tansu Alpcan,Levente Buttyán,John S. Baras Conference proceedings 2010 Springer

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樓主: Monsoon
21#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 05:30:24 | 只看該作者
Disperse or Unite? A Mathematical Model of Coordinated AttackWe introduce a new type of search game that involves a group of immobile hiders rather than a single hider. We provide the mathematical framework for the game and we show that the game is useful to understand under what conditions attackers disperse or unite.
22#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 07:48:45 | 只看該作者
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 17:13:59 | 只看該作者
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 20:28:41 | 只看該作者
Tansu Alpcan,Levente Buttyán,John S. BarasFast-track conference proceedings.State-of-the-art research.Up-to-date results
26#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 03:04:16 | 只看該作者
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/d/image/264327.jpg
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 06:36:36 | 只看該作者
28#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 10:43:36 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62317-6mplete information with customers taking the role of the follower. Firms integrate customers’ optimal decisions into their valuation. Rational utility maximizing customers optimally decide whether to use firms’ services by linking to their own decision threshold. The threshold is their own fair valu
29#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 14:34:52 | 只看該作者
J?rg Polakiewicz,Julia Katharina Kirchmayrm). We obtain some explicit expressions for the solution of the first game, and some structural results as well as explicit expressions for the others. An interesting outcome of the analysis is that the latter two games exhibit switching times for the two players, where they switch from pure to mixe
30#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 18:23:40 | 只看該作者
The Aesthetic Concept of Culture as ArtS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible) epidemic model. For a given level of network defense, we define the strategy of the botnet herder as the solution of a control problem and obtain the optimal strategy as a feedback on the rate of infection. In addition, using a differential game model, we obtai
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