Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 9th International Co Linda Bushnell,Radha Poovendran,Tamer Ba?ar Conference proceedings 2018 Springe

Gullet

書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次




書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學(xué)科排名




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Little

Galactogogue

Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/d/image/264324.jpg

GNAT

剛開始

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5ic nature of losses. It is recognised that this information asymmetry may lead to a “market for lemons” in which suppliers face no incentive to provide higher quality products. Some security vendors have begun to offer cyber-warranties—voluntary ex-ante obligations to indemnify the customer in the e

Rankle

Rankle

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5llicit machine learning classification task. Alice wants Bob (a machine learning system) to learn the task. However, sending either the training set or the trained model to Bob can raise suspicion if the communication is monitored. Training set camouflage allows Alice to compute a second training se

CHASE

ineffectual

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5 architecture or augmenting the training set with adversarial examples, but both have inherent limitations. Motivated by recent research that shows outliers in the training set have a high negative influence on the trained model, we studied the relationship between model robustness and the quality o

CRAB