Titlebook: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2016; 18th International C Benedikt Gierlichs,Axel Y. Poschmann Conference proceedings 2

在駕駛

Differential Computation Analysis: Hiding Your White-Box Designs is Not Enoughhich sell “secure” white-box products. In this paper, we present a new approach to assess the security of white-box implementations which requires . knowledge about the look-up tables used . any reverse engineering effort. This . (DCA) attack is the software counterpart of the differential power ana

DRILL

現(xiàn)任者

Software Implementation of Koblitz Curves over Quadratic Fieldscurves over the base field .. We present a careful implementation of the base and quadratic field arithmetic required for computing the scalar multiplication operation in such curves. In order to achieve a fast reduction procedure, we adopted a redundant trinomial strategy that embeds elements of th

痛苦一下

nitroglycerin

Education Calling for Second Reform,iency thanks to several simulations and experiments..Eventually, we describe a variant of Rivain-Prouff’s multiplication that is still provably secure in the original ISW model, and also heuristically secure against our new attacks.

DEAF

Education Calling for Second Reform, state-of-the-art). As an additional consolidating effort, we finally describe an open source implementation of this new enumeration algorithm, combined with the FSE 2015 rank estimation one, that we make available with the paper.

Foam-Cells

Education Calling for Second Reform, messages for legacy, non-critical components. In addition, vatiCAN detects and prevents attempts to spoof identifiers of critical components. We implemented a vatiCAN prototype and show that it incurs a CAN message latency of less than 4?ms, while giving strong guarantees against non-authentic mess

JUST

Education Calling for Second Reform,and its derivatives, as commonly used in Integrated Circuit (IC) debug for nanoscale low voltage technologies, are successfully launched against a 60 nanometer technology FPGA. We discuss how these attacks can be used to break modern bitstream encryption implementations. Our attacks were carried out

phytochemicals

Malcontent

Sanju Koirala,Prakash Bhattarai,Sarita Barmaesistant core is the smallest in area so far, and its S-box is . smaller than the current smallest Threshold Implementation of the AES S-box with similar security and attacker model. We assess the security of our masked cores by practical side-channel evaluations. The security guarantees are met wit