Titlebook: Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information; Gerhard Clemenz Book 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986 banking.equilibrium.informati

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Irene Dingeldey,André Holtrup,Günter Warseway increasing function of the loan rate of interest r. This could happen if the probability of default is an increasing function of r, and if this negative effect of raising r outweighs its positive effect on p. In this section it is shown more precisely how the non-monotonicity of p with respect to

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Irene Dingeldey,André Holtrup,Günter Warsewa that the relationship between a bank and most of its clients extends over many periods. Many authors have emphasized the importance of this bank-customer relationship, and some have conjectured that credit rationing is a result of the one-period models rather than of asymmetric information and othe

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Irene Dingeldey,André Holtrup,Günter Warsewaurn of the project is a positive, concave function of the loan size according to a conventional neoclassical production function. It turned out that changing from a deterministic to a stochastic world where the project return is a random variable leads to complications which require some restriction

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Institutionelle Dualisierung und Geschlechttric information and variable, endogenously determined loan size. In particular, it has become apparent that allocative efficiency will not be achieved in general, which leaves room for potentially beneficial policy measures, an issue not pursued further in this study. It has also turned out that so

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Loan Markets with Perfectly Divisible Projects,l such models can be hoped to be without becoming indeterminate. The fairly general model of . and . (1984) is presented in some detail, and it is shown that a .-equilibrium need not exist. The aim of these exercises is to indicate how the simpler models used in chapters 6 and 7 could be made more general without affecting the main conlusions.

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