Titlebook: Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya; Roger C. Arditti Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 201

REP

Organisational Conflict,ittee (Far East) in the period between April 1946 and June 1948. Britain’s new post-war intelligence apparatus in the Far East appeared conceptually sound but required time to “bed-in”—for remits to be defined, working practices established and personal relations forged. This, however, never happene

Ornithologist

Haphazard

Paramilitary Intelligence,ntelligence to find and apprehend their insurgent foes. It traces the various operational developments designed to increase the flow of intelligence about the insurgents, including the Ferret Force, the Civil Liaison Corps, aerial surveillance, photographic intelligence, deportation, resettlement, f

GLIB

Policing and Human Intelligence,ecuring human intelligence (humint) which would then direct their paramilitary colleagues in their efforts to locate the insurgents. This, however, provided highly problematic. This was because the government’s strategy in the first four years of the emergency served only to alienate the country’s C

語(yǔ)言學(xué)

Organising Intelligence,ured insurgents, human intelligence from agents and sources, visual and photographic intelligence. All these streams of intelligence coordination if they were to be used profitably. This chapter traces the difficult process of moving from the infirm post-war organisational structures to creating an

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