Titlebook: Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism; Michael J. Shaffer Book 2012 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2012 a

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Rainer Danielzyk,Ilse Helbrechte chapter will be to argue that idealizing theories ought to be treated as a special kind of counterfactual conditional. The third and final goal of the chapter will be to introduce a suitable logic for the regimentation of these sorts of idealizing claims and an account of their truth conditions.

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Epistemic Access, Confirmation, and Idealization,sly, such counterfactual conditionals are contingent truths that purport to tell us something about the behavior of idealized systems in idealized worlds .. Apparently, then, the acceptance of such conditionals must either rather mysteriously depend on evidence that we can gather in the actual world

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Heimat in ?kopsychologischer Sichtnd the use of idealization in the sciences. So, some of the discussion that follows will involve concepts and ideas with which the more sophisticated reader will already be familiar, but this will help to prevent any potential misunderstandings. Let us then begin the defense of scientific realism by

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Introduction,on. We can begin to see that there are problems about truth in the sciences when we recognize that ‘truth’ is truth in a model, or truth in an interpretation. This is the substance of the model-theoretic account of truth. But if we accept the model-theoretic account of truth, then it seems that the