Titlebook: Could there have been Nothing?; Against Metaphysical Geraldine Coggins Book 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Lim

頂點(diǎn)

er. What would it mean for there to be nothing at all? Which scenarios are possible and which are impossible? What’s the fundamental difference between the possible and the impossible? Is the existence of no concrete objects a real possibility? Could there have been nothing?

規(guī)范要多

Could There Have Been Nothing?,er. What would it mean for there to be nothing at all? Which scenarios are possible and which are impossible? What’s the fundamental difference between the possible and the impossible? Is the existence of no concrete objects a real possibility? Could there have been nothing?

Fretful

Overstate

百靈鳥(niǎo)

978-1-349-36476-3Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2010

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范例

PURG

Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument,ilism has various detractors from whom Baldwin. and others wish to defend it. Their defence is the subtraction argument. According to the subtraction argument, because the world would exist if any given object in the world did not exist, so the world would exist if no objects existed at all.

Flatus

The Metaphysics of Subtraction,3) is in doubt. In the previous chapter we considered whether the premises of the subtraction argument are true or not. In this chapter I want to look critically at the underlying argumentative approach used in all versions of the subtraction argument.