Titlebook: Corporate Governance; Essays in Honor of H Joachim Schwalbach Book 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 2001 Agency Problem.Comparative

使閉塞

Motivation: From Material to Mental,Germany and some other European countries have explicitly mandated a formal role for employees in corporate governance, whereas the “Anglo-Saxon” systems of the United States and United Kingdom have basically restricted governance to representatives of the providers of financial capital. The recent

Obstacle

Photography in British Political Historyas pools of specific investors, we ask about the conditions that are necessary to secure the interests of ‘specific human capitalists’ in an efficient way, if the real capital owners’ right to residual control does not solve the ex-post bargaining problems over the sharing of quasi-rents. We disrega

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Photography in British Political Historyit has been argued that owners have lost control of their corporations to managers. This had already been pointed out in 1932 by Berle and Means, and was further stressed by scholars such as Burnham in 1941, and later, in the post-war period, by Galbraith (1967) and Marris (1964). However, in their

跳動

Joachim SchwalbachWell-known authors from academia and from international companies

Deject

紋章

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59499-1Agency Problem; Comparative Systems; Conflict of Interest; Corporate Governance; Governance; Law and Econ

閑逛

978-3-642-63998-2Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 2001

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Photography in British Political HistoryThe purpose of the paper is to reflect on the impact of rising pressure from corporate governance arrangements on management in general. The experience of Deutsche Bank in that regard is reviewed as an example. Five general propositions and two specific ones related to banking, in general, and Deutsche Bank itself, in particular, are presented.

故意

Corporate Governance — Challenges of Increased Management AccountabilityThe purpose of the paper is to reflect on the impact of rising pressure from corporate governance arrangements on management in general. The experience of Deutsche Bank in that regard is reviewed as an example. Five general propositions and two specific ones related to banking, in general, and Deutsche Bank itself, in particular, are presented.