Titlebook: Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems XI; COIN 2015 Internatio Virginia Dignum,Pablo Noriega,Jaime Sim?o Si

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in order to maximise their own utility. However, identifying . contracts—maximising utility while minimising regret— is difficult, particularly when little information is available about provider competencies. In this paper we show that a global contract can be used to govern such interactions, der

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nt Systems, few provide an explicit mechanism for simulating norm-based behaviour using a variety of normative representations. In this paper, we develop an artefact-based mechanism for norm processing, monitoring and enforcement and show its implementation as a framework built with CArtAgO. Our fra

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mance gain that organization can provide across a broad range of conditions. Intuitively, when agents are mostly idle, organization offers little benefit. In such settings, almost any organization—appropriate, inappropriate, or absent—leads to agents accomplishing the needed work. Conversely, when e

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