Titlebook: Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models; Jaeyoung Sung Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under

強(qiáng)壯

Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid WenzelWe briefly introduce an alternative contracting model with time-additive preferences. We study a case that can produce a closed-form solution, and then compare it with the time-multiplicative preference model.

Minatory

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Contracting in Continuous Time: Time-Additive PreferencesWe briefly introduce an alternative contracting model with time-additive preferences. We study a case that can produce a closed-form solution, and then compare it with the time-multiplicative preference model.

奴才

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5487-2Discrete-time Contracting; Mathematical Structures of Contracting Problems; Adverse Selection and Mora

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修飾

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4ement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.

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Variétés différentielles et analytiques in the first-best contracting such as property right and optimal risk-sharing rule, and the participation constraint, and those of the second-best contracting such as nonverifiability of the agent’s actions and the incentive compatibility condition.

Loathe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4and second-best solutions are affected by risk aversion of the two parties, and by such constraints as participation, incentive compatibility, and limited liability. We also learn that the principal expectedly pays the risk-averse agent in the second best more than she does in the first best.

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Incentive Problemsement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.

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