Titlebook: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design; 8th International Wo Sylvain Guilley Conference proceedings 2017 Springer Internation

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Scaling Trends for Dual-Rail Logic Styles Against Side-Channel Attacks: A Case-Study,re more positive (i.e. smaller technologies and supply voltages reduce the energy consumption and the side-channel signal). So these results suggest that dual-rail logic style may not be a sustainable approach for side-channel signal reduction as we move towards lower technology nodes.

avulsion

Dissecting Leakage Resilient PRFs with Multivariate Localized EM Attacks,ttacks against a 45?nm FPGA implementation using AES S-boxes. We show, that even in the case of densely placed S-boxes (with identical routing constraints), and even when limiting the data complexity to the minimum of only two inputs, the guessing entropy of the key is reduced to only ., which remai

ANN

vector

On the Construction of Side-Channel Attack Resilient S-boxes, have only slightly improved side-channel resistance. In this paper, we propose to construct small sized S-boxes based on the results of the measurements of the actual physical attacks. More precisely, we model our S-boxes to be as resilient as possible against non-profiled and profiled physical att

gregarious

Efficient Conversion Method from Arithmetic to Boolean Masking in Constrained Devices,s no advantage in time performance; we call this variant as the generic variant. In this study, we suggest an enhanced variant algorithm to apply to constrained devices. Our solution is based on the principle of the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder, and it uses a divide and conquer approach. In ad

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On the Easiness of Turning Higher-Order Leakages into First-Order,leakages of hardware masking schemes, is based on categorizing the power traces according to the distribution of leakage points. In particular, at each sample point an individual subset of traces is considered to mount ordinary first-order attacks. We present the theoretical concept of our approach

AXIS

Impacts of Technology Trends on Physical Attacks?,re elements. Attacks at printed circuit board level associated with signal processing and machine learning could question this conclusion. Also, as a perspective, we notice that new kinds of attacks become possible on smartphones. Those devices being intrinsically connected, the new side-channel and

帶傷害

Armada

Mind the Gap: Towards Secure 1st-Order Masking in Software, resisting 1st-order, univariate side-channel attacks. Enforcing the ILA in the masked RECTANGLE Sbox requires 1319 clock cycles, i.e. a 15-fold increase compared to a naive 1st-order ISW-based implementation.