Titlebook: Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective; Charles K. Rowley Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 199

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blic choice scholars pursue this approachagainst a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to theUnited States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies andthe third world.978-94-010-6416-3978-94-011-5728-5

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Public choice in a federal system,s two forces operating in a typical federalist system, an expansionist one rooted in the political dynamics analysed here, and a restrictionist one based on the mobility of resources among decentralized entities. This may explain why the empirical record is rather mixed on the contribution of federa

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Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A European constitutional perspective,e point where the task can be effectively performed. Likewise, if an organization is too large to successfully handle particular problems as its procedure may be too cumbersome or as it lacks sufficient detailed information or experience repeated recurrences of problems it has tried to settle, then

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Book 1997 interact and to the processes through whichthese rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This bookmakes the case for an approach to constitutional political economythat is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis.Effective institutional design is simply not feasible u