Titlebook: Computer Security; 23rd European Sympos Javier Lopez,Jianying Zhou,Miguel Soriano Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland A

ABYSS

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-70404-8g, yet fingerprinting practices on this platform have hardly received attention..In this paper, we present the first (to our knowledge) investigation of Android libraries by commercial fingerprinters. Interestingly enough, there is a marked difference with fingerprinting desktop browsers. We did not

harpsichord

Magnitude

,How Were “The Chosen” Chosen?, study the leakage of OPE and ORE and their forward security..We propose generic yet powerful file-injection attacks (FIAs) on OPE/ORE, aimed at the situations of possessing . and range queries. Our FIAs only exploit the . leakage of OPE/ORE (in particular, no need of data denseness or frequency). W

萬(wàn)花筒

做方舟

,How Were “The Chosen” Chosen?,e they usually consume considerable resources at web servers, resulting in high workloads and longer response time, while not bringing in any profit. Even worse, the content of the pages it crawled might later be used for other fraudulent activities. Thus, it is important to detect web bot traffic a

ITCH

長(zhǎng)處

閃光你我

The Gentile Replacement of the Chosen,d other users, allowing sharees also to perform searches. We introduce the concept of a ., an extension of Multi-Key Searchable Encryption (NSDI ’14), that supports dynamic sharing and unsharing of documents amongst users. We also strengthen the security notion by considering a simulation-based noti

Mystic

The Gentile Replacement of the Chosen,lly suffers from file-injection attacks and content leak of deleted documents. To mitigate these attacks, forward security and backward security have been proposed. Nevertheless, the existing forward/backward-secure DSSE schemes can only support single keyword queries. To address this problem, in th

甜瓜

The Christian Academic in Higher Educationd instant messaging applications, especially in East Asia. By a close inspection of their protocols, we give several attacks against the message integrity of Letter Sealing. Specifically, we propose forgery and impersonation attacks on the one-to-one message encryption and the group message encrypti